Conflicts between the Courts of Appeals are of central importance to the American judiciary. When circuits split, federal law is applied differently in different parts of the country. It has long been known that the existence of a circuit split is the best predictor of Supreme Court review, but data availability has constrained understanding of circuit splits to this fact. In this paper, we explore the "life cycle" of an intercircuit split. We analyze an original dataset that comprises a sample of conflicts between Courts of Appeals that existed between 2005 and 2013, including both conflicts the Supreme Court resolved and conflicts it has not yet resolved. We show how long a conflict exists before it is resolved and how many go unresolved altogether, which conflicts are resolved soonest, and how a conflict grows across circuits.
Conflict between Courts of Appeals is of central importance to the federal judiciary.
When circuits split, federal law is applied differently in different parts of the country. As an empirical matter, the existence of a circuit split is one of the best predictors of Supreme Court review. However, despite its importance, scant empirical evidence exists outside of this fact. How many circuit splits go unresolved altogether? Of those that are resolved, for how long do they persist before they are resolved?
Past attempts to answer questions about conflicts in the lower courts have been limited by data availability. Those that have considered conflict holistically, considering all those cases that are in conflict with each other, have studied only conflicts that the Supreme Court has already resolved-which are likely systematically different from those the Court chooses not to resolve. Those studies that have considered the effect of conflict on Supreme Court review, or certiorari, have considered each petition for cert independently rather than seeking to understand how conflicts change and when they are resolved. Additionally, even outside the study of conflict, there is very little quantitative research on litigants' decision to petition for certiorari.
In order to answer these questions, we compiled an original dataset that comprises a sample of conflicts between Courts of Appeals that existed between 2005 and 2013, which includes both conflicts the Supreme Court resolved and conflicts it has not yet resolved-and may never resolve. We thus provide the first look at the universe of existing conflicts. This allows us to explain how long conflicts typically last before they are resolved, how many conflicts go unresolved altogether, and how the evolution of a conflict in the lower courts affects the likelihood the Supreme Court grants cert. It also offers the most comprehensive picture to date of cross-circuit litigant strategy, understanding how conflicts evolve and how litigants manipulate that evolution. In this paper, we present our data and begin to investigate the lifecycle of an intercircuit conflict.
Intercircuit Conflict
The Courts of Appeals decide over 50,000 cases every year (Administrative Office of the United States Courts 2015). When disposing of cases within its own jurisdiction, a given circuit court is not obligated to follow any other circuit's precedent. When a circuit declines to follow other circuits' decisions, it creates a circuit split-disagreement about federal law that means similarly-situated litigants are treated differently in different parts of the country.
Uniformity in the application of federal law by federal courts is a value as old as Federalist 80. In addition to harming this principle, circuit splits have other potentially undesirable consequences: they make it difficult for lawyers to advise their clients, invite additional litigation, circumscribe potentially legal conduct-including making it difficult for business to operate in multiple jurisdictions, or to make contracts that are enforceable nationwideand possibly cast doubt on the legitimacy of the legal system itself (e.g., Hellman 1985; Tiberi 1993) . Circuit splits may also have beneficial effects, most notably, when many circuits consider similar issues and develop law the Supreme Court faces the opportunity to select among many options for the best available doctrine (e.g., Beim 2014; Estreicher and Sexton 1984) .
These divergent doctrines-circuit splits-may arise for a number of reasons. Judges across circuits may simply have different preferences over doctrine. Even in the absence of preference heterogeneity, judges across circuits may face informational asymmetries, depending on the particular cases that arise within their jurisdictions or on the particular arguments litigants make. This may be especially true when there is no clear Supreme Court precedent.
Empirically, evidence is mixed as to what consideration Courts of Appeals judges give to precedents in other circuits. Klein (2002) argues that judges on the Courts of Appeals are actively attuned to the decisions in other circuits that precede them. Wasby (2002) argues, likewise, that circuit judges consider other circuits' decisions, are somewhat wary of creating conflicts, and when a conflict already exists, tend to join the majority of circuits. On the other hand, not all circuit judges claim to give deference to their sibling circuits' decisions (Tiberi 1993, note 65) , and circuit splits are a common phenomenon.
Similarly, there are many avenues by which a circuit split may end. A circuit may repudiate its past decision to come in line with other circuits, Congress or an administrative agency may pass regulations that functionally overrule circuit doctrine, or the split may become dormant. This can happen either because the issue never arises again, or because litigants put it to rest, for example, by following the strictest requirement any circuit has articulated. Resolution by the Supreme Court is the most formal way to bring uniformity to a body of law when circuits split. In the Supreme Court's Rule 10, the presence of a circuit split is one of the only factors explicitly mentioned as a consideration in granting writs of certiorari.
We can see the heavy consideration to which the Supreme Court accords intercircuit conflict in the cases it does decide to hear. Consistent with Rule 10, the Supreme Court is far more likely to review cases that implicate a conflict in the lower courts than those that do not (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Perry 1991; Caldeira, Wright and Zorn 1999; Black and Owens 2009; Epstein, Martin and Segal 2012) . In a review of Burger Court cases, Hellman (1985) found that intercircuit conflict was the modal reason for granting cert and that, in some areas of statutory law, resolving conflict was nearly the only reason the Court heard a case. In recent years, conflict cases have composed about one-third of the Court's docket (Lindquist and Klein 2006) .
The presence of an intercircuit conflict does not guarantee that the Supreme Court will grant review, however.
1 Some conflicts implicate more important areas of the law, potentially 1 At least since 1950. See Tiberi (1993) .
affect more litigants, are more likely to persist, involve more contemporaneous disagreement (are more "live"), or involve cases that are harder to distinguish (are more "square") than others. That is, "there are conflicts, and there are conflicts" (Perry 1991, p. 249) . Because it is so widely know that the Court is more likely to grant review to cases that implicate conflicts-and Gressman et al. (2007, p. 242 ) advise petitioners of this reality-allegation of conflict is common in cert petitions. Much of a law clerk's task is distinguishing genuine from alleged conflict (Estreicher and Sexton 1984) . In a sample of all petitions filed in the 1986-1993 terms, Epstein, Martin and Segal (2012) find that over half alleged conflict but only 14% of those were genuine according to clerks. Even among those that had genuine conflict, only about 16% were granted (compared to less than 2% of petitions that did not).
Thus, even though the Supreme Court is theoretically and empirically interested in resolving intercircuit conflicts, it often declines to review them. For better or worse, intercircuit conflicts persist and often spread, even after litigants bring them to the attention of the Court.
Lack of Theory about Intercircuit Conflict
Theory about intercircuit conflict is shallow in both the legal and political science literatures. In the legal literature, the main theoretical questions involve whether conflict is good or bad for the development of law. When the Supreme Court allows a conflict to persist, or to "percolate" in the lower courts, do the justices learn something by allowing multiple circuits to weigh in before they grant cert to resolve a conflict (Stevens 1982; Wallace 1983; Estreicher and Sexton 1984; Beim 2014) ? Or do they cause harm to litigants by not bringing unity to application of federal laws (Rehnquist 1986; Baker and McFarland 1987; Meador 1989) ?
To the extent that the Court does seek to balance learning and uniformity, there is little evidence that percolated decisions are more well-received than non-percolated ones. Tiberi (1993) finds that negative reviews of Supreme Court decisions, dissents, and Congressional overrides are just as common, if not more
In the political science literature, all theoretical expectations about intercircuit conflict pertain to Supreme Court behavior. Clark and Kastellec (2013) present the only formal model of how justices view the decision to resolve a conflict. In this model, a court that faces a tradeoff between promoting uniformity in the law and learning about legal issues from percolation in the lower courts. The court grants cert to resolve an issue when the costs to allowing the conflict to percolate outweigh the benefits of learning from additional lower courts weighing-in. Outside of this paper, the political science literature has been primarily an atheoretical exploration of whether conflicts are resolved.
Any theoretical considerations of how justices consider intercircuit conflict operate in the shadow of the founding question of judicial politics-does law influence Supreme Court decision making? That ideological considerations influence justices is perhaps the most well-established finding in judicial politics. Scholars seeking to show the influence of nonideological or jurisprudential considerations at various decision points include conflict as one of those factors. According to such accounts, resolving conflicts will matter to justices if they care about clarity and uniformity in the law in addition to pursuing their policy goals. Thus, when deciding whether or not to grant cert to a case, justices should be less likely to vote according to their policy preferences if the case is involved in a conflict (Black and Owens 2009; Epstein, Martin and Segal 2012) . When deciding a case on the merits in order to resolve a conflict, justices should consider which side of the conflict is more legally persuasive in addition to which side aligns with their policy preferences (Lindquist and Klein 2006 Staton and Vanberg 2008; Lax 2012) . Litigants are also rational, forward-looking, and strategic (e.g. Priest and Klein 1984) . They may care not only about the disposition of their own cases but also about legal doctrine. Their decisions to pursue litigation and appeal decisions after a loss are what provide the opportunity for conflicts to arise, for conflicts to spread through other circuits, and for the Supreme Court to resolve them.
Conflict begins and grows as the result of the strategic interactions between judges and litigants. Therefore, understanding the birth and development of conflict is interesting in its own right. And, since these actors are likely forward-looking, understanding these phenomena is crucial for developing a complete understanding of the Supreme Court's decision to resolve conflict.
Scant Empirical Knowledge about Intercircuit Conflict
Just as extant theories of intercircuit conflict are limited to describing how conflict affects Supreme Court behavior, most of what is known empirically about intercircuit conflicts is also about Supreme Court behavior. Many empirical studies of conflict compare cert petitions that the Court granted to those it denied. This is how we know that the proportion of petitions that allege conflict is greater among granted than denied petitions, as discussed above. We also know from these comparisons that the Court is far more likely to review cases involved in true conflicts (Estreicher and Sexton 1984) or deep conflicts as opposed to shallow ones (Black and Owens 2009) .
3 Consistent with theories positing that legal factors interact with ideological considerations in the cert process, Black and Owens (2009) and Epstein, Martin and Segal (2012) find that the probability of cert is affected by justice ideology to a greater extent when non-ideological factors-including lower court conflict-suggest the probability of a cert grant is moderate (not too high or too low).
Occasionally the notion that the Supreme Court either lacks the capacity to resolve important conflicts or is abrogating its duty to do so has given rise to Congressional inquiries.
At the behest of the 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee, Hellman (1995) investigated the number, "tolerability," and "persistence" of intercircuit conflicts implicated by cases in which litigants petitioned for cert but that the Supreme Court nonetheless declined to hear. In the 1989 term, Hellman estimated that the Supreme Court denied cert to petitions implicating between 168 and 274 different intercircuit conflicts. Among those petitions, about onethird involved conflicts that had the potential to cause harm to multicircuit actors, either through the existence of inconsistent obligations or by necessitating compliance with the most restrictive rule. Between one-quarter and one-third involved disagreement over rules that were clear cut enough that the choice of rule would most certainly change the outcome of the case, and an additional thirty to fifty percent involved differences over rules that would favor one side or the other in a class of disputes. That is, a large majority of cert petitions alleging conflict that were denied review involved conflicts that were serious enough to alter the behavior of relevant actors and/or lead to different case outcomes across similar cases.
In a similar set of denied petitions from the 1984 and 1985 terms, Hellman found that only about one-third were resolved by the Supreme Court by the 1992 term, though an additional 25 percent were mooted in other ways.
4
Comparisons of granted and denied petitions increases our understanding of the Supreme Court's certiorari decisions, but does not allow us to understand doctrine-since we do not know what becomes of the denied petitions. 5 They also do not allow us to study conflicts holistically, since we do not know anything about the conflicts, about the other cases involved, beyond the petitions at hand.
Therefore, in an attempt to study how conflict grows over time-how long it lasts in terms of both years and the number of circuits involved, and how the number of circuits on either side of the split affect the likelihood of resolution-a number of scholars have studied conflicts that have been resolved by the Supreme Court. For example, Lindquist and Klein (2006) find that the Supreme Court seems to be more likely to agree with the more "legally persuasive" side in a conflict when deciding a conflict case on the merits. Consistent with a prediction from their percolation model, Clark and Kastellec (2013) find that, among resolved conflicts, the Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari when a conflict arises late in the percolation process than when a conflict arises early in the percolation process.
6
This approach allows inferences about resolved conflicts only, and the conflicts that are resolved-and especially those the Supreme Court states it is resolving-are likely to be different from those that go unresolved (Bruhl 2014) . For example, in a rare study that links cert petitions alleging conflict with information about the circuits involved in the conflict, Grant, Hendrickson and Lynch (2012) find that ideological divergence between circuits on one side of a conflict and the other is positively associated with Supreme Court review.
However, even this strategy is limited because litigants are likely to be strategic; studying only cases in which there was a cert petition still yields a biased sample of all cases involved in conflicts across circuits.
Our project builds on the findings that conflict predicts certiorari, and that the nature of the conflict-including the size, duration, subject matter-affect when and how it is resolved.
We resolve the data limitations that have hindered knowledge about lower court conflicts, thereby allowing us to include conflicts that may never be resolved, and explicitly study conflicts holistically rather than studying petitions individually.
Data
Our data are Courts of Appeals decisions, clustered into conflicts-some of which have been resolved and some of which have not been resolved. We study the growth of conflicts before their resolution. Because our data includes conflicts that have not yet been resolved, we are able to study differences between conflicts that are resolved and conflicts that may never be.
7
Identifying and codifying conflicts poses severe methodological and epistemological obstacles, both for the Court and for researchers. Whether one decision is really in conflict with another is often arguable. Identifying all decisions that are in conflict with any given one is functionally impossible, given the number of cases decided in the federal courts each year. In a comprehensive study of circuit court judges' behavior around intercircuit conflict, Wasby (2002) argues that judges tend to know, discuss, and remark in the written opinion when they create an intercircuit conflict (Wasby 2002, pg. 162) . We therefore dealt with these measurement issues by relying on the courts' own descriptions of conflicts-specifically, we found explicit mentions of conflict and built two datasets by relying on those. we identify only the most severe conflicts and avoid having to create our own subjective guidelines for dealing with these issues.
Because our data includes only conflicts, and not issues on which there is no conflict, we cannot explain how much more likely any given case is to be reviewed by the Supreme Court because it is in conflict with another decision. We also cannot interpret how long the Supreme Court waits before resolving a conflict by relying on the Supreme Court dataset, for the Supreme Court is unlikely to cite the earliest case in a conflict. We study which conflicts get resolved, and how long they persist before they are resolved, by comparing resolved and unresolved conflicts. the judges on the panel, the year of the decision, the composition of the circuit, whether the decision was published, whether there was a concurrence or a dissent, which party appealed from the district court's decision, and whether there was a petition for cert. If so, we noted which party petitioned for cert, whether cert was granted, and, if cert was granted, whether the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in its decision. (In most conflicts, there are only two sides and they are clear.) We also collected information at the conflict-level, including issue area and whether the Supreme Court resolved the conflict. For those cases in which the Supreme Court did resolve the conflict, we took case-level information on the Supreme 10 Hellman (1985, 1995) relies on lawyers' briefs and other court documents to supplement judges' opinions, which can increase the number of conflicts captured but still cannot capture all of them.
11 We hope to determine, in future iterations of this project, how closely our data approximates a random sample of conflicts. Conflicts acknowledged by the Courts of Appeals may be different from unacknowledged conflicts, but conflicts described by the word "disagree" may be no different from conflicts described by the word "depart."
Court's decision from the Spaeth Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2011) .
Analysis
We analyze the "life-cycle" of an intercircuit split. We focus especially on how long the Supreme Court allows conflicts to percolate before resolving them, and which conflicts go unresolved. The former dynamic has received previous attention in judicial politics, which allows us to reconcile our new data with previous results.
In our Courts of Appeals data, an average of 20 conflicts are "born" each year, and an additional 50 conflicts expand (that is, they are joined by new circuits). Figure 1 shows the number of conflicts that are born and expand in each year of the dataset. To be sure, this is an undercount of the number of conflicts that exist in the Courts of Appeals each year.
Many conflicts are live but inactive-no circuit is joining them, so they do not appear in this graph for that year. Still more may be active but unidentified because the courts in question do not explicitly state they are entering a conflict. in the same year, functionally joining simultaneously.) The median is 2. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of years between the case of first impression, and the case that started the conflict. Most conflicts begin very quickly-in the first few years after a decision is issued, another decision is handed down in conflict. The low density on the right tail shows that it is rare to initiate a conflict against a long-standing precedent. In the figure, the black bars are resolved conflicts and the light gray bars are unresolved conflicts. There is no noticeable difference between the two. This means that in the Courts of Appeals data, late-arising conflicts are no more likely to be resolved than early-arising conflicts-a finding that contrasts with Clark and Kastellec (2013) , who look among resolved conflicts and find that resolved conflicts are more likely to have been late-arising than early-arising. shows the proportion of conflicts that age or younger at time of resolution. Looking first at the righthand side of the graph, we see that essentially all conflicts that are resolved are resolved at age 25 or younger. But these conflicts are resolved very young-approximately 70% of resolved conflicts in the Courts of Appeals data were born in the previous 8 years.
The steep curve indicates that conflicts that are resolved are typically resolved very soon after they begin. In each figure, the horizontal axis represents the number of circuits involved in a conflict; the vertical axis represents the proportion of conflicts unresolved with that number of circuits involved. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals around these estimates. As the number of circuits involved increases, the proportion of conflicts unresolved decreases. Since none of the issues in our data were resolved absent a conflict, and since a conflict is only possible once at least two circuits are involved, the solid line starts at 1 at the lefthand side of the graph-all conflicts are unresolved with fewer than two circuits involved. As the number of circuits involved rises past this threshold, the proportion of conflicts resolved increases. For example, of the conflicts in which only three circuits are involved, 93% are unresolved in the Courts of Appeals data and 54% are unresolved in the Supreme Court data. Of the conflicts in which eight circuits are involved, 66% are unresolved in the Courts of Appeals data and only 6% are unresolved in the Supreme Court data. The mean difference in team size at time of resolution is 1.68-one side is slightly larger than the other at time of resolution. In comparing Figure 3 with Figure 7 , we see that, for the conflicts in our Courts of Appeals data, the number of circuits involved is a stronger predictor of resolution than the age of the conflict. We attribute this in part to differences in the natural rate at which cases arise. A conflict about a maritime issue may arise so infrequently that percolation will proceed very slowly. In contrast, the conflict about constitutionality of Obamacare proceeded extremely quickly. 
Issues
The analyses presented herein are our first cut at the data. Below we describe some challenges the data poses for more systematic study. such a low rate? Or are the conflicts in the Court of Appeals Database unusual in some way? It is unlikely that these conflicts will be resolved in the future-we know from the Supreme Court Dataset that conflicts are usually resolved quickly. Therefore, either the rate of resolution is very low or the Court of Appeals Database disproportionately samples conflicts that are likely never to be resolved. But our sample of unresolved conflicts includes only those conflicts where circuit court judges are explicit that there is a conflict, and we know judges care about identifying conflicts-so these are likely to be serious conflicts. One possibility is that the conflicts that are not acknowledged as these are resolved at a much higher rate. This would include conflicts that are not acknowledged by the lower courts and conflicts that are acknowledged but don't include the words "split" or "disagree." We know that sometimes conflicts are not acknowledged by the lower courts because Hellman (1985 Hellman ( , 1995 identifies petitions for cert that claim conflict where it is not referenced by the lower court.
Timing. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to grant cert and resolve a conflict whenever there is a petition for cert in a case that implicates the conflict-but only in those instances. Our current data only includes observations of a circuit creating or expanding a split. We cannot assume that the Supreme Court could have resolved the conflict at any time during its existence-during years when there was no cert petition the Court had no opportunity to resolve the conflict. But we also cannot assume that the Supreme Court could only resolve the conflict by reviewing these precedent-setting cases-the Court has more opportunities than that. In order to gather all possible opportunities for resolution, we are currently collecting Court of Appeals decisions that cite the precedent-setting cases in question. This will give us more fine-grained information on the life-cycle of a conflict. code-all twelve circuits have entered the conflict and the Supreme Court has not resolved it. It is unlikely the Court ever will resolve these conflicts. This means we have two types of conflicts: a type that will be resolved and an immortal type that never is resolved. Modeling the lifecycle under these circumstances poses some challenges.
Discussion and conclusion
By late 2014, the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits had heard cases concerning the constitutionality of gay marriage bans. All had agreed that gay marriage bans were unconstitutional. When litigants petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, they were denied-as often happens when there is no circuit split. Then, in November of that year, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision upholding a ban, thereby creating an intercircuit conflict. The American Civil Liberties Union immediately issued a press release announcing its intention to petition for certiorari, and the director of constitutional litigation for Lambda Legal, a gay rights organization, told the New York Times, "We're extremely disappointed for the families in these four states, but this decision highlights the need for the U.S. Supreme Court to right this injustice" (Eckholm 2014) . Judge Daughtrey, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit panel's decision, wrote that, "Because the correct result is so obvious, one is tempted to speculate that the majority has purposefully taken the contrary position to create the circuit split ... that could prompt a grant of certiorari." These statements reflect an understanding within American courts and scholarship about them-namely, that intercircuit conflicts are resolved and resolved quickly.
Circuit splits are of critical concern for American jurisprudence. Their persistence causes legal difficulty; perhaps as a result, they are a focus of justices and Supreme Court watchers.
Justice White famously wrote a dissent from denial of certiorari whenever the Supreme Court failed to resolve a conflict (Tobias 2003) . In the 1970s, Congress established the Hruska commission to investigate whether the Supreme Court was resolving so few conflicts that there should be a National Court of Appeals charged with their resolution. These positions suggest that circuit splits should be terminated immediately. In contrast, some argue that circuit splits allow for percolation and development of better law (see e.g. Beim 2014). We cannot hope to speak to the normative concerns surrounding legal inconsistency without understanding the empirical realities surrounding circuit splits. There is also almost no positivist theory on the growth or resolution of circuit splits. Nearly all the literature on circuit splits takes their existence and character as exogenous, and aside from acknowledging that circuit splits increase the probability of Supreme Court review there is little theoretical attention paid to what might drive their resolution.
Toward this end, we seek to learn how often and how quickly circuit splits are resolved.
In order to do this, we collected two datasets of intercircuit conflicts-one wholly original and one supplemented with existing data. Our data includes both circuits splits that were resolved by the Supreme Court and circuit splits that may never be resolved. This new data allows us to answer heretofore unanswered questions, such as how many conflicts go unresolved altogether and how long a typical conflict lasts before it is resolved.
We find that very few conflicts in the Courts of Appeals are resolved-only 5% of the conflicts we identified as being born in 2005 have been resolved as of yet. Those that are resolved are resolved soon after they begin-looking both at conflicts identified by the Courts of Appeals and at conflicts resolved by the Supreme Court, the median number of years between birth and resolution is 1. And they are resolved after relatively few circuits join-within the Supreme Court Database, about half of all conflicts are resolved when there are three circuits or fewer involved.
Moving forward, we have two main goals. The first is to gather all Courts of Appeals decisions that are involved in the conflicts we identify (namely, those that cite the precedentsetting cases we have already identified.) This will allow us to understand how often the Supreme Court has an opportunity to resolve conflicts and when it takes those opportunities.
Second, we hope to better understand why the rate of resolution is so low in the Courts of Appeals dataset. Once we have done this, we will be able to assess which conflicts the Supreme Court chooses to resolve and which it leaves unresolved-a question that is of obvious import to the state of American law. senior status) judges who were appointed by a Democratic president. We count a judge as serving for a full year if he served for more than 6 months.
